

22 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CIA View of Administrative Services

1. An examination of MACV's Administrative Services Order of Battle (OB) reveals an interesting contrast between the northern and southern halves of South Vietnam*. As illustrated in Table 1, MACV's Administrative Service OB reflects a .75:1 ratio of support to combat strength in the ~~northern~~^{southern} half of South Vietnam, but only a .48:1 ratio in the northern half.

2. It seems unreasonable that troops in the northern half could be getting along with a full third less support than their counterparts in the southern half. This anomaly is especially perplexing when the higher rate of combat, greater use of heavy weapons, increased frequency and range of movement, and other needs for increased support in the northern half are considered.

3. If the numbers of staff and support troops in the northern half of South Vietnam are increased to make them consistent with the ratio which MACV implies for the southern half, approximately 12,000 Administrative Service troops would be added to MACV's OB.

MACV Administrative Service OB, northern half**	5,000
MACV Administrative Service OB, southern half**	13,250
Added to northern half OB to equalize ratio	12,300

* For purpose of this memorandum, the southern half includes MR's 10,1,4,2, and 3. MR's 5,6, and the Tri Thien Front constitute the northern half.

** Subordinate to subregion, region, front, and COSVN levels.

Subordinate to district and provinces*	27,500
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Total Administrative Services	<u>58,050</u>
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The total Administrative Service OB would then be 58,050.

* CIA estimate used. MACV estimate is 19,400.

Using the latter 58,050 would be reduced to about 50,000.

Table 1

1 January 1968

Southern Half:

Main Force and NVA Strength (CIA estimate)*	37,000
Less estimate of staff and support troops subordinate to divisions and regiments	<u>8,300</u>
Infantry-type and fixe support strength	<u><u>28,700</u></u>
MACV-carried Administrative Service strength subordinate to subregion, region, front and COSVN which support the above troops**	13,250
Staff and support troops listed above	<u>8,300</u>
	<u><u>21,550</u></u>
Ratio of support-type strength to combat strength (21,550 : 28,700)	<u><u>.75:1</u></u>

** Inas much as, we can support an estimate for these commands considerably higher than 13,250 - the difference between these north and South ratios is greater than calculated here.

* a small difference -3- which does not materially change the results.

Northern Half:

Main Force and NVA Strength (CIA Estimate) 62,000

Less estimate of staff and support troops
subordinate to divisions and regiments 16,700

Infantry-type and ~~fixe~~^r support strength 45,300

MACV-carried Administrative Service strength
subordinate to subregion, region, and front
which support the above troops ~~5~~ 5,000

Staff and support troops listed above 16,700

21,700

Ratio of support-type strength to combat
strength (21,700 : 45,300) .48:1

~~5~~

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The two attached sections are intended to be a step by step aid to help the reader track through CIA's Administrative Service estimates. Section I illustrates the arithmetic used in our original estimate -- the 75,000-100,000 range -- as presented at the OB conference. Section II illustrates the revised 1 January 1968 estimate based on a 132,000-142,000 Main and Local Force Order of Battle. We have placed the result, 76,500, in a 60,000-80,000 range.



STAT

I. CIA 31 January 1968 Administrative Services Estimate (as presented to Washington OB Conference).

Component I - Subordinate to province and district.

43,000 - CIA 31 January 68 Local Force OB.

less 10,000 - CIA added small units at province and district levels.

less 2,000 - CIA added pipeline factor.

31,000 - CIA (and MACV) 31 January 68 Local Force infantry-type strength. (30,000 used in Admin. Service estimate.)

15,000 at province level.

15,000 at district level.

15,000 X .9 = 12,500* - Province level.

15,000 X 1.0 = 15,000 - District level.

27,500 - Administrative Services subordinate to province and district levels, 31 Jan 68

Component II

160,000 - CIA 31 January OB.

less 43,000 - CIA 31 January 68 Local Force OB.

117,000 - CIA 31 January 68 Main Force and NVA OB.

less 4,000 - CIA added pipeline factor.

113,000

less 28,000 - CIA estimate of staff and support troops in Main Force and NVA OB subordinate to divisions and regiments. (Projected from 21,000 identified in MACV OB of 84,000.)

85,000 - CIA 31 January infantry-type and fire support Main Force and NVA OB.

*Conservative estimate used at province level. i.e. 1,000 less than the computation yields.

	<u>Combat side of ratio</u>	<u>Support side of ratio</u>
Infantry-type and fire support OB	85,000	
Staff and support troops		28,000
Admin. Services identified by MACV in Main Force-NVA OB	<u> </u>	<u>18,000</u>
Subtotals	85,000	46,000
To achieve 1:1 combat:support ratio, add Admin. Services	<u> </u>	<u>39,000</u>
Totals	85,000	85,000

18,000 - Identified by MACV.

39,000 - Added above.

57,000 - Administrative Services serving Main
Force-NVA and subordinate to subregion,
region, front, and COSVN.

plus 27,500 - Subordinate to provinces and district
level.

84,500 - Total Administrative Service estimate.

Range -- 75,000-100,000

II. CIA 1 January 1968 Administrative Services Estimate (as amended
22 April 1968).

Component I - Subordinate to province and district level.

38,100 - CIA 1 January Local Force OB.

less 7,500 - CIA added small units at province and district levels.

30,600 - CIA 1 January 68 Local Force infantry-type strength. (30,000 used in Admin. Service estimate).

15,000 at province level.

15,000 at district level.

15,000 X .9 = 12,500* - Province level.

15,000 - District level.

27,500 - Administrative Services subordinate to province and district levels, 1 January 1968.

Component II

137,000 - CIA 1 January 68 OB.

less 38,100 - CIA 1 January 68 Local Force OB.

98,900 - CIA 1 January 68 Main Force and NVA OB
(99,000 used in estimate).

99,000

less 25,000 - CIA estimate of staff and support troops in Main Force and NVA OB subordinate to divisions and regiments. (Projected from 21,000 identified in MACV OB of 84,000.)

74,000 - CIA 1 January 68 infantry-type and fire support Main Force and NVA OB.

	<u>Combat Side of Ratio</u>	<u>Support Side of Ratio</u>
Infantry-type and fire support OB	74,000	
Staff and support troops		25,000
Admin. Services identified by MACV in Main Force-NVA OB		<u>18,000</u>
Subtotals	74,000	43,000
To achieve 1:1 combat:support ratio, add Admin. Services		<u>31,000</u>
Totals	74,000	74,000

*Conservative estimate used at province level. i.e., 1,000 less than
the computation yields.

18,000 - Identified by MACV.

31,000 - Added above.

49,000 - Administrative Services serving Main Force-
NVA and subordinate to subregion, region,
front, and COSVN.

plus 27,500 - Subordinate to province and district levels.

76,500 - Total Administrative Services estimate.

Range -- 60,000-80,000